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Bombed Away: How the Second Circuit Destroyed
Fourth Amendment Rights of U.S. Citizens Abroad
“Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the guilty, it
uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law.”1
—Walter R. Mansfield

I. INTRODUCTION
In responding to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
many believe the United States began charting a new course by
which civil liberties were sacrificed in order to protect national
security interests.2 Yet even before those events, the United States
had been targeted by international terrorism and the U.S.
government had been forced to face the issue of how to address
related threats within a legal framework.3 This Note focuses on an
example of one such pre-9/11 attack; namely, the August 7, 1998,
simultaneous bombings by al-Qaeda of the U.S. Embassies in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. While those attacks seem to
have occurred eons ago in the chronology of international terrorism,
a lingering related case has raised new issues pertinent not just to
terrorism, but to criminal justice as a whole.
Specifically, in a surprisingly unheralded decision stemming from
those bombings, the Second Circuit held in In re Terrorist Bombings
1. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing United States
v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973)).
2. See, e.g., John D. Podesta & Raj Goyle, Lost in Cyberspace? Finding American
Liberties in a Dangerous Digital World, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 509, 510 (2005); Alissa
Clare, Note, We Should Have Gone to Med School: In the Wake of Lynne Stewart, Lawyers Face
Hard Time for Defending Terrorists, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 651, 654 (2005); Tara M.
Sugiyama, Note, The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis of Congressional
Oversight During an Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 156 (2006).
3. For example, indictments and/or criminal prosecutions were pursued in response to
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1994 plot to plant bombs on U.S. air carriers
flying over the Pacific Ocean, and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military barracks
in Saudi Arabia. See Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement
Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 310–11 (2003); see also Department of Justice,
Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and Detaining Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System,
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-564.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010)
(highlighting both historic and current terrorism related prosecutions).
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of U.S. Embassies in East Africa (Fourth Amendment Challenges) that
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is inapplicable to
extraterritorial searches of U.S. citizens, even if those searches are
conducted by U.S. officials.4 Though the searches in the case related
to international terrorism, the Second Circuit’s ruling did not create
a related, narrowly tailored warrant exception, but instead applied
across the board to any type of investigation that U.S. officials might
conduct overseas against U.S. citizens. While the court stated that its
decision was based in part on the fact that there was no precedent
establishing that the warrant requirement should apply in such
circumstances, this Note argues that the opinion actually signaled a
significant and deleterious change in the approach toward protecting
the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. citizens abroad.
Part II of this Note begins with a discussion of the Fourth
Amendment itself, including an examination of what protections the
Amendment provides and why they are provided. Part III discusses
whom is shielded by the Amendment’s provisions and then, in order
to establish a general framework for discerning when the Fourth
Amendment is applicable, this Note provides an overview of
important case law related to this issue. With this framework
established, Part IV focuses specifically on Terrorist Bombings and
explains the facts, procedural history, and rule of law to emerge from
that controversy. Part V concludes with an analysis of the case and,
given the developed law in this area, a critique of the decision
reached by the Second Circuit.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Before moving specifically to Terrorist Bombings, this Part
provides a framework for examining the Fourth Amendment issues
presented by the case. First, it explores the relevant provisions of the
Amendment,
including
the
warrant
and
reasonableness
requirements. The following section explains how the Supreme
Court has enforced these requirements upon the executive branch in
various circumstances. Specifically, it chronicles the development of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as applied to extraterritorial
searches of nonresidents, searches conducted against persons within

4. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
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the United States, and extraterritorial searches conducted against
U.S. persons.
A. Provisions of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation.”5 While the plain language of this
Amendment might at first appear clear, its actual application has
been less so; in fact, one Supreme Court Justice commented that
“[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches . . . has not—to put
it mildly—run smooth.”6 One of the most fundamental issues relates
to the prerequisites that must be met in order to conduct a
constitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. On one hand,
the Amendment may be read in such a way that it establishes two
different rights—one prohibiting unreasonable searches and one
requiring probable cause to support any warrants that are in fact
issued.7 Alternatively, the Amendment may in fact declare that a
search is only reasonable when a warrant, establishing probable cause,
is obtained.8 Though this exercise may seem somewhat academic in
light of well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement9—
which by their very existence would seem to render the second
reading impossible—it is nevertheless important insofar as it
establishes the presumptions behind Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In other words, by recognizing these exceptions to
the requirement as “exceptions,” the Court has implicitly indicated a
presumption in favor of obtaining a warrant.

5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
7. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.1 (4th ed. 2004).
8. Id.; see also POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
COMMON LAW 130–31 (1982).
9. Well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement include consensual searches,
exigent circumstance searches (as, for example, when evidence is being destroyed, or officers
are in “hot-pursuit” of a suspect), administrative searches, and searches incident to arrest. INGA
L. PARSONS, FOURTH AMENDMENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005).
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1. The warrant requirement
Beyond simply implying a presumption in favor of search
warrants, however, the Court has in fact repeatedly made explicit
declarations favoring them. The Court has noted, for example, that
“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.”10 And even in creating one of the most
prominent exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Terry Court
was careful to highlight that “police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches . . . through the warrant
procedure.”11 Thus, while there are indeed exceptional situations
wherein a search warrant will not be mandated, the Court has
nevertheless been clear as to what is the background norm.
Because the Court has been so persistent and adamant regarding
this warrant requirement, it is worth briefly exploring the rationale
behind such a position. While there are undoubtedly a number of
reasons for the Court’s posture, two justifications are particularly
worthy of examination here. The first rests on the nature of the right
to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the Court
noted over a century ago that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”12 Indeed, as the Supreme Court
explained more recently, the Fourth Amendment “codified a preexisting right”13 to be free from unwarranted government searches
that rested on principles of natural rights and natural law.14 With this
understanding, it is easier to appreciate the gravity of the warrant
10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations omitted); see also
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) (“There are exceptional circumstances in
which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may
be contended that a magistrate’s warrant for search may be dispensed with.” (emphasis
added)).
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at
347; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Chapman, 365 U.S. at 610). For a more
comprehensive study of Terry and the related “Terry stops,” see POLYVIOU, supra note 8, at
231–59.
12. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
13. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).
14. See, e.g., John P. Feldmeier, Note, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez:
Constitutional Alchemy of the Fourth Amendment, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 521 (1991).
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requirement since “the Fourth Amendment does not purport to
create a right,” but instead simply “enjoins government from
violating a right assumed to exist.”15 In other words, warrants serve
the function of creating “clear and unquestionable authority” for the
government to conduct searches that would otherwise violate an
inviolable right, and accordingly, the warrant requirement should
not be lightly disregarded.
A second justification for the Court’s strong presumption in
favor of a search warrant centers on constitutional principles of the
separation of powers, which ultimately exist to protect individual
rights. More directly, the Court has noted that to effectuate a
legitimate search, a “neutral and detached magistrate [is] required by
the Constitution.”16 Though this necessity is not explicitly set forth
in the Constitution, its structure does imbue each branch with such
checking functions on the other branches. Indeed, in expounding
upon this notion, the Court has said:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement
the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence
sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to
issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search
without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity . . . .17

Such language indicates an acknowledgment by the Court that when
the warrant requirement is jettisoned from the Fourth Amendment,
the rights of those subjected to searches are left to the unfettered
prerogative of the executive. In recognition of the fact that such
“unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures
. . . and overlook potential invasions of privacy,”18 the Court has

15. Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Note, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial
Power and the United States Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 147, 169 (1999).
16. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971); see also Shadwick v. City
of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348–50 (1972); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967).
17. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (citation omitted).
18. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (citing NELSON B.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 79–105 (1937)).
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stated that “those charged with [] investigative and prosecutorial
duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally
sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”19
2. Reasonableness
As important as the warrant requirement clearly is, there is no
doubt that the Fourth Amendment also requires that searches be
“reasonable.”20 Since the main focus here is on issues pertaining to
the warrant requirement, a thorough examination of the
“reasonableness requirement” necessarily falls beyond the scope of
this Note. There are, however, a few things worth highlighting as
predicates for analysis of the Terrorist Bombings case. First, the Court
has declared that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness,”21 and “the balancing of competing interests.”22
Under this rubric, “the permissibility of a particular law enforcement
practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interest.”23 Flowing from this is the observation that
the Court has repeatedly indicated that reasonableness is contextdependent.24 Thus, there are no bright-line rules for the
reasonableness of searches, and the inquiry will instead depend on
the circumstances surrounding each search.25 Finally, it is also
important to recognize that the prohibition against unreasonable
searches applies at both the initiation and the execution phases.26 In

19. Id.
20. As noted previously, and despite the arguments presented above, some
commentators have even suggested that, in light of the exceptions to the warrant requirement,
it is arguable that the exclusive mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that a search be
reasonable. POLYVIOU, supra note 8, at 131. Notably, however, Polyviou also asserts that the
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment generally requiring a search warrant “command[ed]
the support of the Supreme Court” at least at the time of his publication. Id.
21. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
22. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring).
23. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
24. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“Reasonableness . . . is
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.”); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (“The reasonableness of an official invasion of the
citizen’s privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time that
invasion occurred.”).
25. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39.
26. Rachael A. Lynch, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Fourth Amendment Right:
Samson Court Errs in Choosing Proper Analytical Framework, Errs in Result, Parolees Lose
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other words, it must first be reasonable to perform a search, and then
the search itself must be carried out in a reasonable manner.
Though reasonableness has been declared the “touchtone” of
the Fourth Amendment, this last point suggests that a reasonableness
determination still hinges, in most cases, upon the warrant
requirement. The government official designated by the
Constitution as the decider of whether a search is reasonable is a
member of the judiciary. As noted above, this is because a judicial
officer can examine probable cause evidence in a neutral and
detached manner. While some suggest that determinations of
reasonableness can be made ex post—that is, after a search—such an
argument ignores the judicial officer’s responsibility to ensure that
initiating a search in the first place is reasonable.27
In sum, it suffices on this point to highlight the Court’s
recurring language insisting that the Fourth Amendment generally
requires that a warrant be obtained in order to preserve the
constitutionality of a search. While there are indeed notable
exceptions, the fact that such exceptions fail to comport with the
rationale for the warrant requirement is indicative of the fact that
they represent anomalies rather than rules. Though the Court has
indicated that reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment, this could be seen as strengthening rather than
undermining the warrant requirement, since the warrant procedure
ensures that a magistrate deem a search reasonable before the
magistrate even issues a warrant.
B. When the Fourth Amendment is Applicable to a Search
The Supreme Court has long-since established that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”28 Though it is not entirely
clear from the Amendment who these “people” are, it is plain that
the Fourth Amendment imbues them with certain rights. This
section examines the Court’s approach to the question of whether

Fourth Amendment Protection, 41 AKRON L. REV. 651, 676–77 (2008); Stacy E. Roberts,
Note, Bond and Beyond: A Shift in the Understanding of What Constitutes a Fourth
Amendment Search, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 457 (2002).
27. To be sure, in instances where law enforcement officers rely on an exception to
conduct a warrantless search, this is exactly the type of analysis the judiciary engages in. As has
been argued above, however, the Court has expressed that warrantless searches should be the
exceptions rather than the rule.
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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Fourth Amendment guarantees extend to searches in three different
circumstances; namely, (1) extraterritorial searches of nonresident
aliens by U.S. officials, (2) domestic searches of such persons within
the United States, and (3) extraterritorial searches of U.S. citizens.
By extracting the principles the Court has set forth in these
situations, a framework can be established for application by
extension to Terrorist Bombings.
1. Extraterritorial searches of nonresident aliens by U.S. officials
Whether or not constitutional provisions generally do, or should,
apply to nonresident aliens is an issue subject to debate.29 While an
in-depth exploration of this question is not necessary here, it is
important to give a brief examination of the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to nonresident aliens. One of the principal
questions in this area is whether nonresident aliens fall within the
contours of “the people” discussed in the Fourth Amendment. In
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court answered this inquiry
by defining “the people” as: “a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”30 Consequently, the Court held that a nonresident
alien, whose home in a foreign country had been searched without
warrant by U.S. authorities, was not entitled to the protections of
the Fourth Amendment because he was not “one of the people.”31
In explaining this result, the majority went to great lengths to
highlight Verdugo-Urquidez’s status as a nonresident alien. Indeed,
the Court noted that “it was never suggested that the [Fourth
Amendment] was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal

29. See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global
Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007); Jon Andre Dobson, Note, Verdugo-Urquidez: A Move
Away from Belief in the Universal Pre-Existing Rights of All People, 36 S.D. L. REV. 120
(1991); Leah E. Kraft, Comment, The Judiciary’s Opportunity to Protect International Human
Rights: Applying the U.S. Constitution Extraterritorially, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1073 (2004).
30. 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (citing U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279
(1904)). It is this language that has given rise to the phrase “U.S. persons”—the term of art
that is used in portions of this Note. Significantly, it is still not entirely clear who this group
entails, though it is clear that it encompasses those with “voluntary attachment to the United
States” who also have a “sufficient connection” to the United States that they can be
considered part of the community. Id. at 265, 274–75.
31. Id. at 265.
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Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.”32
Further, although Verdugo-Urquidez had cited several cases that
seemingly suggested that there was precedent for the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment in his circumstances,33 the Court
emphasized that each of the cases he relied on addressed issues
related either to U.S. citizens, or to aliens within the territory of the
United States.34
It is important to stress how vital the Court’s definition of “the
people” who are protected by the Fourth Amendment was to the
holding in Verdugo-Urquidez. In determining that nonresident aliens
were not entitled to the Amendment’s safeguards, the Court appears
to have relied significantly on principles of social compact theory,
which suggests that people give up certain rights to a government in
order to enjoy other benefits it grants. Indeed, the majority cited
dissenting language from the Ninth Circuit’s Verdugo-Urquidez case
positing that “the Constitution [is] a ‘compact’ among the people of
the United States, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment
were expressly limited to ‘the people.’”35 Accordingly, as one
commentator has suggested, “[n]ot being part of the compact that
surrendered some rights to secure others, nonresident alien targets of
U.S. law enforcement have . . . no right to challenge the actions of
the U.S. Government.”36
Despite the seeming simplicity of such an approach, it is also
subject to several critiques. First, such social compact ideals reject the
notion, explained above, that the Fourth Amendment simply codifies
natural rights.37 In other words, by failing to extend the
Amendment’s safeguards to nonresident aliens subjected to searches
by U.S. officials, the Court rejected the notion that such rights were
in any way pre-existent to their codification. Moreover, the VerdugoUrquidez majority created an odd situation whereby nonresident
aliens are forced to comply with U.S. law even though they only
receive a portion of its protection when they are prosecuted for
32. Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 269–73.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 264 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1231 (9th
Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting)).
36. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 444, 453 (1990).
37. See Mark. L. LaBollita, Note, The Extraterritorial Rights of Nonresident Aliens: An
Alternative Theoretical Approach, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 363, 388 (1992).
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violating it.38 As the dissent put it, this “creates an antilogy: the
Constitution authorizes our Government to enforce our criminal
laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise this authority,
the Fourth Amendment does not travel with them.”39 Similarly,
beyond any rights a defendant may or may not have under the
Fourth Amendment, it seems troubling to accept the notion that
U.S. authorities themselves are not bound by it. The majority
apparently recognized this issue, given its assertion that a U.S.
warrant “would be a dead letter outside the United States.”40
Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain why a warrant would not
increase the search’s legitimacy of police power within the United
States.
Notwithstanding these disconcerting issues, however, the fact
remains that the case does provide a clear indication of the Court’s
position as to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in these
circumstances. After Verdugo-Urquidez, it is plain that nonresident
aliens cannot depend on the Amendment to protect them from
searches conducted outside the United States, even if U.S.
authorities execute those searches.41 Equally apparent is that an
important justification for this rule of law is that such aliens have not
established a “sufficient connection” with the United States to be
considered part of the U.S. community.
2. Searches conducted within the United States
In stark contrast to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
to overseas searches of nonresident aliens, the Amendment’s
protections have, for some time, been strictly applied when
conducted in the United States. That said, there are still intricacies in
this doctrine that are important for an understanding of issues
presented by Terrorist Bombings.42

38. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282. The “portion” of protections refers to the fact
that the Court did express that nonresident aliens prosecuted in the United States are still
entitled to certain due process rights codified in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 264.
39. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 274 (majority opinion).
41. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v.
Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 8–9
(1st Cir. 2007).
42. Not the least of these issues relates to the collection of foreign intelligence
information, which in light of the events of September 11, 2001, is an area of the law that has
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In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States,
which involved a warrantless wiretap by the FBI of a public phone
booth in Los Angeles alleged to have been used for interstate
wagering.43 Despite the government’s assertions that Fourth
Amendment protections did not extend to a public phone booth, it
was in Katz that the Court clearly established that the Amendment
“protects people, not places.”44 Though the Court acknowledged
that the officers had exercised restraint in initiating and executing the
search, the majority nevertheless deemed it a violation of the
suspect’s constitutional rights, since “this restraint was imposed by
the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.”45 Indeed, the agents
had not been “required, before commencing the search, to present
their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral
magistrate . . . [and] were not compelled, during the conduct of the
search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a
specific court order.”46 Without such judicial oversight, the Court
recognized that an individual’s rights would be secure only to the
extent permitted by the executive’s discretion, a scenario that was
unacceptable under the Constitution.47 After Katz, it was thus clear
“that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.”48
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Katz, however, and one
which presaged the pending explosive debate about the necessity of
obtaining a warrant for intelligence collection, was a footnote in the
opinion directed at the issue. Specifically, the majority noted that
“[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the
national security is a question not presented by this case.”49 This
footnote prompted Justice White to write in a concurring opinion

undergone drastic change in recent years. It is important to keep in mind, however, the scope
of this Note and its focus on events that occurred in the late 1990s.
43. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
44. Id. at 351.
45. Id. at 356.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 358–59.
48. Id. at 357.
49. Id. at 358 n.23.
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that a warrant should not be required if the President or Attorney
General deemed a search necessary for national security purposes.50
Feeling “compelled to reply” to Justice White’s opinion, Justice
Douglas in turn underscored the difficulty with such a scenario in
our constitutional system.51 The executive branch, he said, is not
neutral and detached, nor should it be. Instead, “it should vigorously
investigate and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute
those who violate” the law.52 Nevertheless, because “spies and
saboteurs” are protected by the Fourth Amendment as much as any
other criminal, Justice Douglas asserted that the interposition of a
neutral and detached judicial official is necessary to maintain the
integrity of the process and to ensure that civil liberties are not
sacrificed in the pursuit of justice.53
The exchange between the two Justices is remarkable because it
foreshadowed the clash in the late 1960s and early 1970s (not to
mention in the post-9/11 era) between protecting “national
security” interests and securing personal freedoms. That conflict
came to a head in United States v. United States District Court
(“Keith”).54 The suit sprang from charges related to the bombing of
a CIA office in Michigan.55 In preparation for the trial, the
defendants filed a motion to compel the government to disclose
surveillance information collected as part of their investigation.56 The
government in turn filed an objection with an affidavit from
Attorney General John Mitchell explaining that the searches had
been conducted at his direction, without warrant, in the interest of
national security.57 The Court was thus squarely presented with the
issue of whether the executive branch could dispense with the
warrant requirement in a domestic search if the purpose of the search
was to collect national security information.
In resolving the matter, the Court addressed fundamental issues
of our constitutional system, including presidential authority and
50. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 359–60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 360.
54. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The convention of referring to this case as “Keith” relates to
the fact that Judge Keith was the district court judge who ordered that the government turn
over the information it had collected.
55. Id. at 299.
56. Id. at 299–300.
57. Id. at 301.
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separation of powers. The Court was careful, however, in framing
the question, emphasizing that the Attorney General’s affidavit
indicated that the searches in this case were directed only at domestic
threats, and there was otherwise no evidence of foreign
involvement.58 With this parameter established, the Court began its
analysis by noting that the Constitution vests the president with the
duty of preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution, a
responsibility that implicitly includes protecting the government
from threats of overthrow.59 While acknowledging that this power
had to be tempered when it abutted civil liberties, the Court also
noted that “unless Government safeguards its own capacity to
function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could
become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be
endangered.”60 Nevertheless, the question was not whether the
president had a domestic security role, but instead whether such a
role had to be exercised in accord with the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment.61 Citing Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Katz, the
Court reaffirmed that the Amendment “does not contemplate the
executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested
magistrates.”62 Instead, its directives require the interplay of both the
executive to investigate and prosecute crime, and the judiciary to
ensure that there is sufficient reason “to justify invasion of a citizen’s
private premises or conversation.”63 Consequently, the Court held
that despite compelling justifications to the contrary, the warrant
requirement applies even to domestic searches conducted for
national security purposes. To hold otherwise would have failed to
adequately protect individual liberties and preserve the values at the
root of our constitutional system.64
It was thus clear after Katz and Keith that, as a rule, a warrant
would generally be required for searches conducted within the
United States. One question that Keith had expressly left open,
however, was whether the warrant requirement applied to searches

58. Id. at 308–09.
59. Id. at 310.
60. Id. at 312.
61. Id. at 320.
62. Id. at 317 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359–60 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
63. Id. at 316.
64. See id.
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within the United States conducted by U.S. agents for the purpose
of foreign intelligence collection.65 Given this open area of the law,
lower courts understandably began filling it, though they did so in
disparate ways. In the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, for
instance, courts created an exception to the warrant requirement
whereby the judiciary would not have to pre-approve searches
conducted under the auspices of foreign intelligence collection.66
Conversely, in the Watergate-related case of United States v.
Ehrlichman, the District Court for the District of Columbia declared
that there was no national security exception to the warrant
requirement for domestic searches “even when known foreign agents
are involved” in the criminal activity.67 Likewise, in a separate case,
the D.C. Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment’s dictates did not
yield to the President’s authority over national security issues.68 In
fact, the D.C. Circuit went so far as to criticize other courts for
ignoring the question of whether there were “valid reasons for
abrogating the warrant procedure when foreign relations are
implicated . . . .”69
Given this inconsistency, as well as the political and social
environment of the post-Watergate era, the time was ripe in 1978 for
Congress to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).70
Since the Act plays a role in the searches at issue in Terrorist
Bombings, a very general discussion of its provisions is in order.71
65. Id. at 321–22 (“[T]his case involves only the domestic aspects of national security.
We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with
respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.”).
66. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 912–16 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875–76 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604–
05 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425–27 (5th Cir. 1973). For an
analysis of these cases, and this issue generally, see Justin M. Sandberg, Comment, The Need
for Warrants Authorizing Foreign Intelligence Searches of American Citizens Abroad: A Call for
Formalism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 409–12 (2002).
67. 376 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D.D.C. 1974).
68. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
69. Id. at 633.
70. See Cedric Logan, Note, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 209, 217–18 (2009).
71. FISA is a very complex statute, which has undergone numerous changes since 1978,
so this Note will necessarily only be able to address a few aspects of it. It is notable, however,
that significant changes were incorporated via the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001. Pub. L. No.
107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). The limited scope of
this Note, however, focuses on events transpired between approximately 1996 and 1998, so it
will be necessary to focus attention on the state of the law at that time.
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At its most fundamental level, FISA was enacted as an attempt to
balance Fourth Amendment rights against the need to conduct
domestic national security intelligence collection.72 In order to effect
this purpose, the 1978 Act required that the executive branch (more
precisely, the President, acting through the Attorney General) obtain
an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
before conducting a search against U.S. persons for foreign
intelligence purposes.73 To obtain an order for such a search, FISA
directed the Attorney General to show probable cause only that the
target was a foreign power, or an agent thereof.74 Among the Act’s
most important limitations was that, by its terms, FISA only applied
to electronic surveillance conducted within the United States.75
Though a 1994 amendment extended the FISC’s authority to issue
orders for physical searches, the Act’s territorial aspect—that is, the
limitation to searches within the United States—was not formally
extended until 2008.76 As will be discussed in more detail later, the
reality was that FISA orders were often required even for
extraterritorial searches. The point here, however, is to accentuate
that there was no doubt after FISA passed in 1978 that judicial
interposition in the form of the FISC was required even for foreign
intelligence collection against U.S. citizens within the United States.

72. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15 (1978) (“The history and law relating
to electronic surveillance for ‘national security’ purposes have revolved around the competing
demands of the President’s constitutional powers to gather intelligence deemed necessary to
the security of the nation and the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”).
73. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804–05 (1982). If no U.S. person was targeted, the Attorney
General was not required to receive pre-authorization, though the Attorney General was still
required to certify to the FISC that he or she had personally authorized the search. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1802 (1982). A U.S. person was defined, in part, as a U.S. citizen or permanent resident
alien. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). Interestingly, the FISA Court of Review (the FISC appellate
court) has asserted that a FISA order “may not be a ‘warrant’ contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment.” In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717, 741 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2002). While acknowledging the merit of arguments supporting this contention, for the
purposes of this Note, the author accepts arguendo that FISA orders do satisfy the warrant
requirement. Finally, it is worth noting that the general constitutionality of FISA was affirmed
in United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984).
74. Defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978).
75. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). Title I of FISA was entitled
“Electronic Surveillance within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes.” Id.
76. 50 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994). The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 codified the change
to the territorial aspect of the Act.
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Thus, with FISA’s passage, the state of the law regarding
searches within the United States at the time of the events
surrounding Terrorist Bombings had generally been established. First,
it was clear after Katz that domestic searches of U.S. persons for
strictly criminal investigation purposes generally required a warrant.77
The warrant requirement had also withstood the attack in Keith,
wherein the Court had declared that warrants were generally
required for searches related to domestic security. Though the law
certainly took a more complex turn after Keith, the bottom-line is
that FISA directed that a judicial panel pre-authorize any searches
within the United States carried out upon U.S. persons for foreign
intelligence collection purposes. In sum, there was no circumstance
that generally permitted a search on U.S. persons within the United
States without some sort of judicial review. A gaping hole left
unaddressed by case law and FISA, however, was whether the
warrant requirement applied to U.S. persons abroad.78
3. Extraterritorial searches of U.S. persons
In Terrorist Bombings, the Second Circuit seems to have rightly
recognized that “whether a warrant is required for overseas searches
of U.S. citizens has not been decided by the Supreme Court, by our
Court, or as far as we are able to determine, by any of our sister
circuits.”79 Given the aforementioned discussion, the central
question regarding the applicability of the warrant requirement to
U.S. persons abroad seems to be whether their circumstances are
more similar to foreign searches of nonresident aliens, domestic
searches of U.S. persons, or some combination of the two. This
inquiry necessarily begins with the question of whether
constitutional protections, and the Fourth Amendment in particular,
apply at all to U.S. citizens who are overseas.
77. The author notes that they are “generally” required only so as to pay homage to the
well-established exceptions.
78. As alluded to briefly above, this hole was filled somewhat with the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008, which requires that a FISA order now be obtained for
extraterritorial searches of U.S. persons conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. That
amendment, in fact, has made the foreign intelligence collection issues in Terrorist Bombings
somewhat moot. In proclaiming that the warrant requirement never applies to extraterritorial
searches of U.S. citizens, however, the Second Circuit swept in criminal investigations, which,
as this Note argues, seems inconsistent with the rest of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
79. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157, 168 (2d Cir. 2008).
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One of the landmark cases dealing with the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution to U.S. citizens is Reid v. Covert,
which established that the safeguards of the Bill of Rights generally
extend to cover U.S. citizens abroad.80 The case involved two
women who had been tried in overseas military tribunals for killing
their husbands. Though their husbands were in the military, neither
woman was. Accordingly, they challenged their courts-martial as
unconstitutional insofar as the courts-martial had deprived them of
their Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections.81 Emphatically, the
Court declared, “When the Government reaches out to punish a
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another land.”82 While Reid centered primarily on Fifth and Sixth
Amendment safeguards, the Court spoke more generally of the
applicability of the Constitution abroad. It said, for example, that the
Constitution manifests that its “protections for the individual were
designed to restrict the United States when it acts outside of this
country, as well as here at home.”83 Though there had been
arguments that only certain rights should extend abroad, the Court
stated that there was no logic behind suggestions that “picking and
choosing among the remarkable collections of ‘Thou shalt nots’”
was appropriate.84
This line of reasoning was later generally extended to the Fourth
Amendment, although overseas searches have involved additional
analysis. Specifically, case law clearly establishes that the applicability
of even the “reasonableness requirement” of the Fourth Amendment
to searches conducted against U.S. citizens abroad depends on who
conducts the search. If foreign officials conduct the search wholly,
for example, the Fourth Amendment’s protections will not apply,
even if evidence collected is subsequently turned over to U.S.
officials pursuing a criminal prosecution.85 The rationale behind this
rule is that foreign officials cannot be expected to comply with the

80. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
81. Id. at 3–5.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 8–9.
85. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976); United States v. Rose,
570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1969).
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U.S. Constitution and suppressing evidence they seize would have
no deterrent effect on their conduct.86 On the other hand, if a search
is conducted as a so-called “joint venture” between U.S. and foreign
officials, the reasonableness aspect of the Fourth Amendment is
implicated.87 Such a policy prevents U.S. officials from “attempting
to shortcircuit the Fourth Amendment rights” of a suspect by tacitly
condoning otherwise illegal searches solely because they were
ostensibly conducted by foreign officials.88 Finally, by implication,
since the Fourth Amendment applies to these joint venture searches,
it obviously extends to searches conducted entirely by U.S. officials.
This position generally does not appear to be in dispute, as even the
Second Circuit in Terrorist Bombings accepted that the searches at
issue in that case had to adhere to the Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement (though it rejected the applicability of the warrant
requirement).
Beyond these doctrines established by case law, FISA has also
played a role in extraterritorial searches.89 As noted in the previous
section, FISA, by its terms, was formally limited only to domestic
searches. Though the contours of the Act may have seemed well
defined, the reality of its application has been significantly less so.
More directly, despite the Act’s domestic focus, one expert testified
before Congress that “the Government often needed to obtain a
court order before intelligence collection could begin against a target
located overseas.”90 The principle reason for this rested in the Act’s
complex definition of electronic surveillance and the fact that
Congress had not kept it up to date with changing technologies,

86. See Rose, 570 F.2d at 1361–62. Incidentally, the Rose court recognized a widelyaccepted exception to this rule where the circumstances of the search “shock the conscience”
of the court. In such cases, the evidence may be excluded, even if the search is conducted
wholly by foreign officials. Id. at 1362.
87. See, e.g., Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 743. In order to have a joint venture, U.S. officials
must “substantially participate” in the search. Id.
88. Id. at 746.
89. Due to the classified nature of FISA searches, it is difficult to discern to what degree
any of these searches were conducted against U.S. citizens in particular. Given the testimony
before Congress outlined below, the author presumes, for the sake of this argument, that
searches against U.S. citizens occurred in at least some instances.
90. Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Kenneth L.
Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, Department of Justice),
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/docs/final-wainstein-sjc-testimony-103007.
pdf.
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which often allowed the user to be in a vastly different location than
a telecommunications service provider.91 While certain government
officials were critical of the fact that they had to obtain FISA orders
for such overseas searches,92 their criticisms seem to have rested on
the fact that foreigners should not be protected by FISA’s
procedures. This is evident in a statement made to Congress in 2006
by the National Security Agency’s General Counsel that “the issue
on which the need for a court order should turn . . . is whether or
not the person whose communications are targeted is generally
protected by the guarantees of the Constitution . . . . [P]eople
outside the United States who are not U.S. persons . . . should not
receive such protection.”93 Given this language, it seems clear that
even within the Intelligence Community, there was at least some
recognition that U.S. citizens abroad should be treated differently
than foreigners. Indeed, in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
Congress itself codified the requirement that FISC orders must be
obtained before electronic surveillance of overseas U.S. persons can
be carried out.94
Thus, while the issue of the warrant requirement’s applicability
to U.S. citizens overseas had indeed not been squarely addressed by
the courts or Congress by the time of the Terrorist Bombings case,
there was clear evidence suggesting a concerted effort on the part of
both to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of at least U.S.
citizens. A wrinkle in this analysis, however, is Executive Order
12,036, which was issued by President Jimmy Carter in January of
1978.95 This directive permitted warrantless physical searches against
U.S. persons, but only if the President had generally authorized the
type of activity involved, and the Attorney General had specifically
approved its application to the particular search at issue.96 Notably,
91. Basically, while the actual target of a search may have been in an overseas location,
he might have been using electronic telecommunications providers either situated in, or in
some manner passing through, the United States. By its terms, FISA required a FISC order for
searches of this nature. For more information, see Proposed FISA Modernization Legislation:
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 8–9 (2007) (statement of
Mike McConell, Director of National Intelligence).
92. See Legislative Proposals to Update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Robert L. Deitz,
General Counsel, National Security Agency).
93. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
94. 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2008).
95. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978).
96. Id. at 3685.
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this order was issued before FISA was enacted, though President
Ronald Reagan authorized a similar practice three years after FISA’s
passage.97 In part 2.5 of the Reagan Order, the President granted the
Attorney General authority “to approve the use, for intelligence
purposes, within the United States or against a United States person
abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if
undertaken for law enforcement purposes.”98 Importantly, this
directive still required adherence to FISA, so the order basically only
extended to warrantless physical searches and activities against
overseas targets.99 As grounds for asserting such power, the President
referred to authority vested in him by the Constitution.100
Of course just because the President asserted such authorization
did not necessarily make it so. Indeed, there is strong evidence
indicating that any inherent constitutional power the President may
have had this area was abrogated by Congress when it passed FISA.
A seminal case addressing this relationship between Congress and the
President’s inherent authority is Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer.101 In Youngstown, Justice Robert Jackson established in a
concurring opinion a framework through which the interaction
between the two branches can be examined.102 First, Jackson said
that when the President acts with congressional authorization, his
power is at its zenith.103 Next, where the President acts in the
absence of either congressional approval or disapproval, “he can only
rely upon his own independent power.”104 Indeed, this is an area
Jackson called the “zone of twilight” because the powers of the two
branches may overlap and create uncertainty.105 Finally, when acting

97. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981). Executive Order 12,333
revoked order 12,036.
98. Id. at 59,951.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 59,941. Of note, President Reagan also asserted authority granted in the
National Security Act of 1947, but as explained below, that Act had no relation to the section
at issue here. See infra note 107.
101. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
102. Id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Though this was only a concurring opinion,
later cases indicate the acceptance of Justice Jackson’s reasoning. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491, 494 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006); Crosby v.
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000).
103. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
104. Id. at 637.
105. Id.
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contrary to congressional will, the President’s “power is at its lowest
ebb.”106
At best, Executive Order 12,333 was an example of the President
acting in the “twilight zone.” Clearly there had been no statutory
indication from Congress granting the President the authority he
relied upon in issuing the directive.107 While it can be argued that
congressional disapproval had not been expressly manifest, and that a
failure to express such displeasure indicated tacit support for the
President’s actions, the trajectory of case law and Congress’s failure
to reverse that tide—as well as FISA’s passage itself—belie this
argument. In fact, as one commentator has suggested regarding the
Order, all “available evidence indicate[d] congressional hostility
toward warrantless searches.”108 Such a posture is especially
unsurprising given the political atmosphere of the post-Watergate
era. After investigating government intelligence collection activities
in the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, the Church Committee had
noted: “We have seen segments of our Government, in their
attitudes and action, adopt tactics unworthy of a democracy, and
occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes.”109 Of
course it cannot go unnoticed that Congress did not respond to the
Reagan Order, but to suggest that this indicates express support
would be a stretch. Indeed, as the Court has said in other contexts,
drawing such a conclusion would require “piling inference upon
inference,” because of an “absence of direct proof.”110 It would first
have to be assumed, for example, that Congress did not believe that
FISA had put the issue to rest. Next, it would have to be assumed
that Congress’s inaction was not the result, for instance, of the
difficulties associated with the legislative process itself, or of an
unawareness of the precise dictates and contours of the Reagan
Order.111
106. Id.
107. As explained above, President Reagan also asserted authority vested in him by the
National Security Act of 1947. While this may indicate congressional support for some of the
Order’s provisions, the Act did not grant the President the authority asserted under section
2.5, the main provision at issue here.
108. David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of
Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 637 (1983).
109. S. Rep. No. 94-755, book 2, at 3 (1976).
110. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 15 (1954).
111. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671–72 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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The point is, of course, that there are numerous problems with
viewing congressional inaction to Executive Order 12,333 as
congressional acquiescence or approval to its directives. In its best
light, then, Executive Order 12,333 was an example of the President
acting in the “zone of twilight,” where he could rely only upon
whatever inherent powers he may have had to authorize the activities
the Order permitted. Given the conflict in this case between these
powers and the Fourth Amendment, it seems quite reasonable to
suggest that Congress felt such powers should yield to other
constitutional rights. At worst, then, the issuance of the Order
showcases the President acting at a time when his power was at its
lowest ebb, since its dictates did not comport with apparent
congressional will (and certainly judicial intent) regarding the
appropriateness of warrantless searches—particularly when those
searches were carried out against U.S. citizens.
III. TERRORIST BOMBINGS
With this groundwork established, this Part shifts focus
specifically to the Terrorist Bombings case. The first section provides a
summary of facts relevant to an understanding of the Second
Circuit’s eventual ruling. Next, the Note summarizes the procedural
history of the case, which is especially important since the Second
Circuit, while reaching the same ultimate conclusion as the lower
court, employed distinctly different reasoning to get there. Finally,
this Part concludes by explaining the four factors the Second Circuit
used to support its conclusion that the warrant requirement is
inapplicable to foreign searches conducted against U.S. citizens.
A. Facts
While the Terrorist Bombing case involves issues all too familiar
to Americans today, it began in a time when “al-Qaeda” was not part
of the average person’s lexicon. American intelligence had been
investigating Osama Bin Laden, however, since at least 1996, when
he declared a war of terrorism against U.S. military personnel—a
threat that he extended to all U.S. citizens in 1998.112 Then, on
August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda launched one of its first major attacks on
the United States by simultaneously detonating truck bombs at the
112. United States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden II), 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
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U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.113
Between the two bombings, the death toll reached over 220.114 Two
years later, fifteen defendants led by Osama Bin Laden were facing
trial after having been indicted on 267 criminal offenses, including
murder, maiming, and various conspiracy charges.115 Importantly,
one of the defendants, known as Wadih El-Hage, was a U.S.
citizen.116
Though a U.S. citizen, El-Hage lived in Kenya from 1994 to
1997.117 During the time he was living in Nairobi, American officials
became aware of his ties to al-Qaeda.118 In fact, from August 1996 to
August 1997, U.S. officials monitored five telephone lines in Kenya
that were alleged to have been used by al-Qaeda operatives.119 One
of these lines was located in a building in which El-Hage lived, and
another was a cell-phone used by several parties, including ElHage.120 Significantly, Attorney General Janet Reno had authorized
specific targeting of El-Hage, but did not do so until April 4,
1997.121 Thus, there was no formal authorization for the searches
conducted from August 1996 to April 4, 1997. On August 21,
1997, presumably based on information collected from all of these
intercepts, U.S. officials, in cooperation with Kenyan authorities,
conducted a physical search of El-Hage’s home in Nairobi.122
Though they still had no U.S. warrant, American officials did present
El-Hage’s wife with a document subsequently “identified as a
Kenyan warrant authorizing a search for ‘stolen property.’”123
Notably, however, U.S. officials later indicated that they placed no

113. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11
306–07 (2006).
114. Id. at 308.
115. Id.
116. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2008). For more information
about Wadih El-Hage, see Oriana Zill, A Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist,
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.
html.
117. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 159.
122. Id. at 160.
123. Id. (quoting Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 269).
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legal authority in the Kenyan warrant.124 Given the classified nature
of the case against El-Hage, it is difficult to know the nature of the
evidence collected against him since, even at trial, it underwent in
camera review. It is important to emphasize, however, that at least
insofar as court records indicate, there were no further searches
conducted against El-Hage until after the bombings, and he does
not appear to have been detained at any point during that time. After
the bombings in August of 1998, El-Hage returned to the United
States and was subpoenaed to testify about al-Qaeda to a federal
grand jury investigating the attacks.125 Moreover, during August and
September of 1998, El-Hage’s home in Arlington, Texas was
surveilled pursuant to a FISA order.126 Eventually, El-Hage was
arrested and charged for his participation in the embassy
bombings.127 The charges against El-Hage in particular included six
conspiracies to kill U.S. citizens and destroy U.S. property abroad,
twenty counts of perjury, and three counts of giving false
statements.128
B. District Court Disposition
In defense, El-Hage filed a motion in district court to suppress
evidence seized in the warrantless searches carried out against him by
U.S. officials. Specifically, El-Hage’s motion to suppress focused on
evidence seized from (1) the physical search of his Nairobi residence,
(2) the electronic surveillance of the telephone lines he used in
Kenya, and (3) the electronic surveillance, carried out pursuant to a
FISA order, of his home in Texas.129 As grounds for suppression, ElHage asserted that the searches violated his Fourth Amendment
rights because they were conducted without a warrant, or
alternatively, because they were unreasonable.130 On December 5,

124. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
125. United States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden I), 92 F. Supp. 2d 225, 231 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
126. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 268 n.2.
127. Id.
128. United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2000).
129. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 268. Before the district court ruled on the motion
to suppress as related to the Texas FISA search, El-Hage withdrew that motion. In re Terrorist
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings),
552 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2008).
130. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
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2000, the district court issued an opinion denying both El-Hage’s
request for an evidentiary hearing and his suppression motion.131
1. Evidentiary hearing
Instead, based on the government’s assertion that a proceeding
in open court would jeopardize continuing investigations into alQaeda, the court assessed the evidence against El-Hage in an in
camera, ex parte review.132 Though the Supreme Court has affirmed
the legality of such reviews,133 as noted by the district court in this
case, several courts have also cautioned against their overuse.134
Given the unique facts of the conspiracy at issue in this case,
however, the court was persuaded that an in camera, ex parte review
was appropriate to preserve the integrity of the government’s
ongoing investigation.135 This finding was supported, in the court’s
estimation, by the fact that El-Hage’s motion predominately
centered on legal rather than factual questions, so the benefits
associated with an adversarial proceeding were less critical.136 While it
is hard to argue with the court’s decision in light of the
circumstances of the case, it bears emphasizing that a defendant in a
case like this will almost always face a high hurdle in overcoming the
government’s arguments. Given the classified nature of much of the
evidence, and the serious threats that such defendants are alleged to
pose, it is hard to imagine them commonly prevailing in an effort to
receive an evidentiary hearing.
2. Application of the Fourth Amendment overseas
After deciding on an in camera, ex parte review of the evidence,
the court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment applied at all to
overseas searches.137 In exploring this issue, the court noted that
“[t]he Government seems to concede the general applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to American citizens abroad, but asserts that the

131. Id. at 286–88.
132. Id. at 286–87.
133. See, e.g., Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317–18 (1969).
134. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (citing United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d
593, 607 n.78 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1983)).
135. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 270–71.
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particular searches contested in this case (which were conducted
overseas to collect foreign intelligence) call for a more limited
application of the Amendment.”138 Thus, it is significant that the
government never argued that there was generally no warrant
requirement for overseas searches of U.S. citizens; instead, it argued
a foreign intelligence exception applied. In its own analysis of the
Fourth Amendment’s overseas applicability, the district court
asserted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid appeared to
suggest that the Amendment did apply to U.S. citizens abroad.139
Consequently, while explicitly observing that “the extent of the
Fourth Amendment protection, in particular the applicability of the
warrant Clause, is unclear,” the court determined that at least some
of the safeguards of the Amendment applied in this case.140
3. The foreign intelligence exception
Consequently, the real issue at the district court level was
whether there was an exception to the Fourth Amendment that
applied to the searches in this case. At the outset of this analysis, the
court dismissed any doubt that might have existed about the
possibility that the search was a joint venture between U.S. and
Kenyan authorities.141 Addressing this issue was necessary in light of
the “warrant” that Kenyan authorities provided to El-Hage’s wife
during the physical search of their Nairobi property.142 The court,
however, rejected the idea that the search was a joint venture—which
might arguably have provided El-Hage with more protection—based
on the government’s assertion that “American authorities . . . did
not rely upon the Kenyan warrant as legal authority for the
search.”143
With that matter settled, the court directed its attention to the
government’s argument that a foreign intelligence exception applied
138. Id. at 270.
139. Id. at 270–71.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 271.
142. Id. at 271 n.6.
143. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 4, No. 1:98CR01023). The assertion that a
joint venture search might provide more protection is based on the fact that courts occasionally
have viewed such searches skeptically, construing them as attempts by U.S. officials to “shortcircuit” Fourth Amendment rights. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. Had the
court found a joint venture search, it is possible (though by no means necessary) that the court
could have used such reasoning to grant the motion to suppress.
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in this case to the warrant requirement. In examining this claim, the
district court highlighted that the Supreme Court had recognized
the issue in Keith, but had not resolved it.144 While acknowledging
that other district and circuit courts had squarely addressed the issue
of a domestic intelligence exception, the district court professed that
“[n]o court has considered the contours of such an exception when
the searches at issue targeted an American citizen overseas.”145
Significantly, the court also noted that since those cases had not
applied to U.S. citizens abroad, and because they were adjudicated
before FISA’s enactment, even if those situations were to arise again
they would currently be governed by FISA anyway.146 In other
words, the court determined there was a complete dearth of
precedential authority, and that it was in the awkward situation of
having to decide a case when subsequent statutes had changed the
legal landscape. As a result, the court turned instead to an analysis of
the factors underlying the foreign intelligence exception to
determine if its application was appropriate in this case.
According to the court, the executive’s authority over foreign
affairs constituted a “determinative basis” for applying the foreign
intelligence exception. Specifically, the court referenced the case of
United States v. Curtiss-Wright, in which the Supreme Court had
accepted the “plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.”147 As applied to the particular facts in the present case, the
court noted that it was also “generally recognized that this authority
includes power over foreign intelligence collection.”148 That said, the
court acknowledged that even in Curtiss-Wright itself, it was
apparent that the president’s foreign affairs authority had to yield to
other express restraints of the Constitution.149 Despite this apparent
nod to moderation, the court asserted that the executive had been
engaging in warrantless foreign intelligence searches for decades.150

144. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
145. Id. at 272.
146. Id. at 272 n.8; see supra note 78 (discussing subsequent changes to FISA that have
partially filled this gap in the law).
147. Id. at 272 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
148. Id. (referring to Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875); Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 605–06 (1988)).
149. Id. at 273.
150. Id.
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While “Congress ha[d] legislated with respect to domestic incidents
of foreign intelligence collection . . . [it] ha[d] not addressed the
issue of foreign intelligence collection which occur[ed] abroad.”151
Though the court stated that this supposed congressional silence was
not dispositive, it clearly played a significant role in the ultimate
outcome of the case.
Beyond the president’s foreign affairs power, the court felt that
the costs associated with imposing the warrant requirement also
called for application of the foreign intelligence exception. According
to the court, the burdens of obtaining a warrant were apparently
disproportionate to the benefits to be gained by doing so.152 Further,
the court accepted the argument that the “judicial branch is ill-suited
to the task of overseeing foreign intelligence collection.”153 This
contention had been advanced by the government, on the basis that
a court would be unable to ascertain the full impact of its decisions
upon foreign policy.154 Moreover, the court found persuasive that “a
procedure requiring notification to [a hostile] government could be
self-defeating.”155 Additionally, the court posited that requiring
judicial review prior to a search in foreign intelligence cases would
create unbearable delay for the executive.156 Though an exigent
circumstance exception already existed for such circumstances in
domestic cases, the court was unconvinced “that the exigent
circumstances doctrine provide[d] enough protection for the
interests at stake.”157 Finally, the court accepted the government’s
argument that involving the judiciary in the pre-approval process
would increase the possibility of security breaches.158 The court was
careful, however, in its attempt not to impugn the judiciary, stating

151. Id.
152. Id. (“[S]everal cases direct that when the imposition of a warrant requirement
proves to be a disproportionate . . . burden on the Executive, a warrant should not be
required.” (emphasis added)).
153. Id. at 274. While the court proceeded to say that the incompetence of the judiciary
related to domestic intelligence had been somewhat undercut by Keith, it found the argument
persuasive as related to foreign intelligence.
154. Id.
155. Id. Unfortunately, the court failed to explain why it believed such notification would
be required.
156. Id. at 275.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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that the “mere perception that inadvertent disclosure is more likely is
sufficient to obstruct the intelligence collection imperative.”159
Lastly, the foreign intelligence exception was necessary,
according to the court, because there was, at that time, no procedure
by which U.S. officials could obtain a warrant to conduct an overseas
search.160 In fact, the court noted that there was not even then
statutory authority for searches conducted abroad for standard law
enforcement purposes.161 El-Hage argued on this point that if the
government was going to conduct extraterritorial searches, it must
find a way to do so constitutionally. In responding, the court noted
that the judiciary may have inherent authority of its own to effect the
dictates of the Fourth Amendment.162 In other words, regardless of
what statutory power may or may not exist, if a warrant was
required, the judiciary had authority to issue it. While briefly
acknowledging this possibility, however, the court ultimately
determined that acquiring a warrant for the searches at issue in this
case “would certainly have been impracticable given the absence of
any statutory provisions empowering a magistrate to issue a
warrant.”163
Given the aforementioned justifications for the foreign
intelligence exception, the court generally accepted the merits of the
foreign intelligence exception and formally adopted it. In an attempt
to remain true to the Fourth Amendment, however, the court was
careful to explain how narrowly it had tailored the exception. As
adopted, it included “only those overseas searches, authorized by the
President (or his delegate, the Attorney General), which are
conducted primarily for foreign intelligence purposes and which
target foreign powers or their agents.”164

159. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent, No. 1:98CR01023).
160. Id. at 275–76. In cases of domestic or international terrorism, current criminal
procedure rules allow magistrates to issue warrants outside of their assigned districts if any
related activity has occurred within their districts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(3).
161. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 275 n.13.
162. Id. at 276–77.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 277 (citing United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 915–17 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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4. Application of the foreign intelligence exception to searches conducted
against El-Hage
After formally adopting the foreign intelligence exception as a
general principle, the court next had to decide if it applied to this
specific case. Briefly, in order to apply the exception to this case, the
court determined that the government had to show that El-Hage
was an agent of foreign power, that the searches were conducted
primarily for foreign intelligence collection rather than criminal
investigation, and that the president or attorney general had
authorized the searches.
In addressing these issues, the court first stated that it was clear
from its review of the evidence that there was probable cause to
suspect that El-Hage was an al-Qaeda operative.165 As such, he
qualified as an agent of a foreign power, as defined by Congress.166
Next, in assessing whether the search was primarily conducted for
intelligence collection or a criminal investigation, the court said that
although criminal evidence was certainly acquired from the searches,
they had primarily been conducted as foreign intelligence efforts.167
This finding was based on numerous factors, including the fact that
the FBI was apparently not the lead agency when the searches were
carried out.168 The most challenging factor in applying the exception
became the need for the searches to have been authorized by the
executive. As noted above, Attorney General Janet Reno had
authorized U.S. officials to target El-Hage on April 4, 1997.169 The
problem was that the searches against telephone lines he used had
commenced well before that—specifically, in August of 1996. After a
lengthy analysis, the court addressed this temporal gap by admitting
the evidence based in large part on the good faith exception
articulated in United States v. Leon.170 Indeed, the court found that
“the officials who conducted the electronic surveillance operated
under an actual and reasonable belief that Attorney General approval
was not required prior to April 4, 1997, when El-Hage was

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 278 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)–(b) (2008)).
Id. at 278–79.
Id.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 283–84 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
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specifically identified . . . as a target . . . .”171 Accordingly,
suppressing the seized evidence would not, in the court’s estimation,
have fulfilled the exclusionary rule’s underlying goal of deterrence.
Based on each of these findings, the court was persuaded that
applying the foreign intelligence exception was appropriate in this
case. Consequently, the court held that El-Hage’s Fourth
Amendment rights had not been violated, even though no warrant
had been obtained for the search of his home in Nairobi.172 In
reaching this conclusion, it is again important to highlight that the
district court did not find that the warrant requirement never applies
to U.S. citizens abroad. Instead, its holding was limited to foreign
intelligence collection operations.
5. Reasonableness
Finally, while the reasonableness requirement is not the primary
focus of this Note, it should be noted that the court closely
examined the searches at issue in this case to determine whether they
had been conducted in a reasonable manner.173 This is important
because, had the court found the searches unreasonable, it could
simply have disposed of the case on those grounds. Paramount to the
reasonableness analysis was a review of the techniques employed by
the government to minimize the privacy invasion while collecting
information from El-Hage’s telephone conversations.174 This scrutiny
was necessitated based on El-Hage’s argument that the searches were
unlimited and lacked specificity, therefore rendering them
unreasonable.175 Given the global and diffuse nature of the
conspiracy, however, the court granted the government more leeway
regarding the procedures it had used during the operation. Beyond
the geographic hurdles, this was also necessary, the court said,
because the alleged conspirators spoke a foreign language, used

171. Id. at 284.
172. Id. at 285.
173. Of course, as noted above, given the fact that the court rejected the warrant
requirement, there is a strong argument that the searches were therefore inherently
unreasonable. Furthermore, even if one were to accept that the searches were reasonable
without the warrant, there are serious questions about whether the minimization efforts really
were sufficient, and whether the length of the searches (over one year) made them at least
“less” reasonable.
174. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 285–86.
175. Id. at 285.
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communal phones, and could likely have used code language to
discuss their planning activities.176 With this extra latitude, the court
had little trouble finding that the searches had been conducted in a
reasonable manner.177
Given the government’s success in proving that the searches were
reasonable, and in light of the court’s application of the foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, the court
confidently rejected El-Hage’s motion to suppress. It did so,
however, in a very narrowly tailored fashion, limiting the exception
to foreign intelligence searches authorized by the President or
Attorney General. In fact, as noted above, this exception was so
narrowly tailored that it was essentially swallowed up by the
subsequent FISA Amendments Act of 2008.178 Had the Second
Circuit simply adopted the findings of the district court, this case
would not be so troubling. Instead, however, the Second Circuit
took a far more sweeping approach in addressing the Terrorist
Bombings case on appeal.
C. Second Circuit Disposition
Ultimately, El-Hage’s case went to trial and a jury convicted him
of the charges.179 Thereafter, he appealed, challenging, among other
things, the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the
evidence seized during the Kenyan searches, as well as the resolution
of that motion without an evidentiary hearing.180 Significantly, ElHage argued that the foreign intelligence exception was inapplicable
to the searches against him because they had been conducted as part
of a criminal investigation rather than as an intelligence collection
operation.181 He also continued to assert that the searches themselves
were not conducted in a reasonable manner because they were
overbroad.182
176. Id. at 286.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 78.
179. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 101–02 (2d
Cir. 2008).
180. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2008). As indicated above, ElHage withdrew his motion related to the FISA search of his Texas property. The propriety of
that search, therefore, was not an issue before the Second Circuit. See supra note 129.
181. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 164.
182. Id. at 174.
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1. Evidentiary hearing
As a preliminary matter, the court rejected El-Hage’s contention
that he should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing on the
motion to suppress.183 In doing so, it reasserted the district court’s
rationale that the ongoing nature of the investigation of al-Qaeda
required an in camera review. Specifically, while acknowledging ElHage’s interest in reviewing the evidence against him, and his need
to challenge the assertions of the government, the court felt that
“the imperatives of national security and the capacity of in camera
procedures to adequately safeguard El-Hage’s Fourth Amendment
rights weighed against holding an evidentiary hearing” under the
circumstances of the case.184
2. Reasonableness
Regarding the reasonableness of the searches, the court likewise
held that the “searches’ intrusion on El-Hage’s privacy was
outweighed by the government’s manifest need to monitor his
activities as an operative of al-Qaeda because of the extreme threat
al-Qaeda presented . . . to national security.”185 Moreover, while the
court acknowledged that “El-Hage suffered, while abroad, a
significant invasion of privacy,” it also felt that the government was
justified under the circumstances.186 In other words, though the
searches may have been overbroad in other contexts, they were
appropriate in a case such as this given: (1) the complex and
decentralized nature of al-Qaeda, (2) the fact that the value of
intelligence information is not always immediately apparent, (3) the
tendency for conspirators to speak in code, and (4) the difficulties
associated with foreign language intercepts.187 Because these factors
presumably will be present in most international terrorism
investigations, and given the potential gravity of the threat posed by
183. Id. at 165.
184. Id. at 166 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
185. Id. at 172–73. Significantly, given the court’s rejection of the warrant requirement,
this balancing test appears to be the new contour of Fourth Amendment rights in the Second
Circuit for searches conducted against U.S. citizens abroad. Though not revolutionary (see
supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text), such a balancing test related to a constitutional
right is disturbing since the balancing will always occur ex post. Thus, the limits of one’s rights
will not be apparent until after a search has already been carried out.
186. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 175.
187. Id. at 175–76.
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such groups, one is left with the impression that a search would have
to be blatantly unreasonable in order to be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, because the court determined
that the searches were reasonable, the outcome of this case
necessarily hinged on whether the searches violated the Fourth
Amendment for being conducted without a warrant.
3. The foreign intelligence exception
On this issue, it is important to begin with the fact that the
Second Circuit declined to adopt the foreign intelligence exception
as applied to this case.188 In apparent recognition of the difficult
issues raised by El-Hage—namely, the complexities of parsing
criminal investigations from intelligence collection operations—the
court found application of the exception “inapt” here.189 Indeed,
because adopting the exception would have required “an inquiry
into whether the ‘primary purpose’ of the search [was] foreign
intelligence collection” as opposed to a criminal investigation, the
court altogether abandoned any effort to apply the exception in this
case.190 Such a decision was actually unsurprising given developments
in the law in the intervening years between the disposition of this
case at the district and circuit court levels. More directly, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review had stated in a 2002 case
that the so-called “primary purpose” test—that is, the determination
of whether the primary purpose of a search was for criminal or
intelligence purposes—rested on a false assumption that “once the
government moves to criminal prosecution, its ‘foreign policy
concerns’ recede . . . .”191 Because there was no easy way to discern
the line between these two types of investigations, the Second
Circuit simply refused to apply the exception in Terrorist Bombings.
188. Id. at 171–72.
189. Id. at 172.
190. Id. (citation omitted).
191. Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2002)). Readers familiar with FISA and its impact on the relationship between the Department
of Justice and the Intelligence Community will recognize this as a rudimentary explanation of
what has sometimes been termed “the FISA Wall” or, more simply, “the Wall.” After 9/11,
“the Wall” received much attention, and much blame, for perceived failures in information
sharing between the FBI and the Intelligence Community. For more information, see NAT’L
COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, 78–80 (2004) and Cedric Logan, Note, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 209 (2009).
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4. Application of the Fourth Amendment overseas
With the foreign intelligence exception therefore deemed
inapplicable, the Second Circuit continued its analysis, as the district
court had done, with an inquiry into whether the Fourth
Amendment even applied at all to U.S. citizens located overseas.192
Relying on Reid, as well as cases from its own circuit, the court
asserted that the Bill of Rights generally does apply extraterritorially
to protect U.S. citizens against illegal conduct of U.S. authorities.193
Nonetheless, the court noted that no case had precisely addressed
whether the warrant requirement specifically applied under the
circumstances of this case.194 Having abandoned the relatively narrow
foreign intelligence exception applied by the district court, the
Second Circuit issued a sweeping opinion that the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement “does not govern searches
conducted abroad by U.S. agents,” and that “such searches of U.S.
citizens need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of
reasonableness.”195 This extensive holding was based on four factors
the court felt weighed against the obligation to obtain a warrant;
namely, (1) the absence of precedent mandating the requirement for
a warrant in such circumstances, (2) the “inadvisability of
conditioning our government’s surveillance on the practices of
foreign states, (3) a U.S. warrant’s lack of authority overseas, and (4)
the absence of a mechanism for obtaining a U.S. warrant.”196 Each of
these factors will be examined in turn.
First, the court contended that there was no precedent
suggesting that U.S. officials are required to obtain a warrant to
conduct searches abroad.197 In making this assertion, the court relied
on language from Verdugo-Urquidez, wherein the Supreme Court
had held, as explained above, that a warrant was not required for a
search by U.S. officials against aliens abroad.198 In dicta from that
case, however, the Second Circuit noted that the Court had also said
192. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 167.
193. Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957); Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d
1179, 1189 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280–81 (2d Cir.
1974)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 172.
197. Id. at 169.
198. Id.
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that “‘the history of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment . . .
suggests that its purpose was to restrict searches and seizures which
might be conducted by the United States in domestic matters.’”199
Moreover, the court maintained that the warrant requirement’s
language had been imbued with a different meaning when drafted
than it has in modern times.200 Specifically, citing language from the
dissent in Payton v. New York, the court suggested that the Fourth
Amendment, as originally constituted, had been drafted not to
protect criminal suspects, but to strengthen the authority of law
enforcement agents.201 Indeed, according to Justice White’s Payton
dissent, the warrant requirement had not originally been offered to
restrict law enforcement officials, but rather to grant them
“delegated powers of a superior officer such as a justice of the
peace.”202
In a footnote after this discussion, the court noted that the
interest generally served in having a neutral and detached magistrate
make a probable cause determination to ensure that issuing a warrant
would be appropriate.203 Nevertheless, the court felt those interests
were lessened in cases like this because judicial officials in the United
States would have difficulty determining whether an overseas search
was in fact reasonable, and because the executive’s power over
foreign affairs “ought to be respected in these circumstances.”204
Accordingly, and in light of the additional findings above, the court
determined that nothing in the historical record indicated that a
warrant was required for foreign searches, whether against a U.S.
citizen or not.205
As a second factor weighing against the warrant requirement for
overseas searches, the court asserted that there was nothing to
suggest that U.S officials would be required to “obtain warrants
from foreign magistrates before conducting searches overseas or,
indeed, to suppose that all other states have search and investigation

199. Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 169–70 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 604–14 (1980) (White,
J., dissenting)).
202. Payton, 445 U.S. at 607–08 (White, J., dissenting).
203. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 170 n.7.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 169–70.
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rules akin to our own.”206 Relying again on dicta from VerdugoUrquidez, the court declared that “the Constitution does not
condition our government’s investigative powers on the practices of
foreign legal regimes.”207 Perhaps owing to the nonsensicality of this
argument, there was only one paragraph related to this issue in the
court’s opinion, so the contours of this factor are not entirely clear.
The tenor seems to indicate, however, that the court was concerned
that imposing the warrant requirement would mandate that U.S.
officials who wished to conduct an overseas search obtain a warrant
from the overseas judiciary (assuming there was one) rather than
from a U.S. magistrate. As the court understandably did not wish for
this result, its analysis led it to the conclusion that a warrant was not
necessary.
In a related vein, the court felt that even if a U.S. magistrate
were to issue a warrant for a search against a U.S. citizen abroad,
that warrant would have little, if any, legal authority overseas.208 As
support for this argument, the court noted the obvious fact that
nations have their own sovereignty and that they therefore would
not be constrained in any way to cooperate with a U.S. search
warrant. In determining that such a warrant would be a “nullity,”
the court thus stated that “[a] warrant issued by a U.S. court would
neither empower a U.S. agent to conduct a search nor would it
necessarily compel the intended target to comply.”209 Given the
“dead-letter” nature of such a warrant under these parameters, the
court clearly felt no compunction in jettisoning the warrant
requirement from the Fourth Amendment for overseas searches
against U.S. citizens.
Finally, in what was perhaps the soundest prong of its analysis,
the Second Circuit felt that the warrant requirement must not apply
to overseas searches, because there was simply no procedure in place
whereby U.S. officials could obtain a warrant to conduct an overseas
search against a U.S. citizen.210 Though the district court had at least
206. Id. at 170.
207. Id. at 171.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. As noted above, this gap in the law has been partially filled in since the disposition of
this case. Federal criminal procedure rules have changed and FISA amendments now allow the
issuance of FISA orders for foreign intelligence collection. The parameters of the rule and Act,
however, still appear to leave a gap as to a mechanism to obtain warrants for overseas searches
in strictly criminal investigations.
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entertained the possibility of inherent judicial authority to issue such
warrants, the Second Circuit decided instead that it “need not
resolve that issue” in the present case.211
IV. ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS
Despite the court’s apparent confidence to the contrary, it is
extremely difficult to reconcile the holding in Terrorist Bombings—
namely, that the warrant requirement does not apply to searches
conducted by U.S. officials against U.S. citizens abroad—with the
prior trajectory of case law and congressional action pertaining to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This section takes up an analysis
of the Second Circuit’s opinion and explains why the decision is so
troubling, and how it places U.S. citizens abroad at risk of
inappropriate privacy invasions. As highlighted above, the court
rested its holding on four factors; namely, (1) the absence of
precedent requiring a warrant for overseas searches, (2) the
inadvisability of conditioning our own government’s surveillance on
the practices of foreign states, (3) a U.S. warrant’s lack of authority
overseas, and (4) the absence of a mechanism for obtaining a U.S.
warrant.
A. The Second Circuit’s Factors Making the Warrant
Requirement Inapplicable
1. Absence of precedent mandating the requirement for a warrant
As its first factor explaining why the warrant requirement was
inapplicable to overseas U.S. citizens, the Second Circuit noted an
apparent dearth in precedent requiring a warrant in such
circumstances. While there indeed has been no case expressly
establishing that precise principle, all case law and congressional
action that does exist certainly supports such a notion. Katz
established, for instance, that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable.212 Moreover, as outlined above, after Katz, Keith, and
the passage of FISA, there is no search in the United States itself that
could generally be conducted without a warrant.213 Given Katz’s
further declaration that the Fourth Amendment applies to people
211. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 171.
212. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations omitted).
213. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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rather than places, it is hard to resolve the Second Circuit’s
unwillingness to apply the warrant requirement to a U.S. citizen
overseas, when it would surely be required if that same person were
in the United States. In fact, as mentioned above, though the
government had argued for application of the foreign intelligence
exception, even it did not make the argument in Terrorist Bombings
that the warrant requirement was generally inapplicable to searches
against U.S. citizens abroad.
Even for searches conducted abroad, the court’s decision is on
shaky ground. Specifically, while case law has established that
evidence seized by foreign officials in a search against a U.S. citizen is
admissible even if the search violates the Fourth Amendment, this
latitude has not been extended to searches by U.S. officials. This
makes imminent sense, given the fact that the rationale behind such
a rule is that U.S. officials cannot expect foreign authorities to
comply with U.S. laws. On the other hand, even if the search is the
result of a cooperative joint venture between U.S. and foreign
authorities, the fact that U.S. officials participate in any meaningful
way does implicate the Fourth Amendment. Admittedly, to this
point, these cases have only required compliance with the
reasonableness aspect of the Amendment, but as this Note has
attempted to explain, there are strong arguments against the notion
that the reasonableness requirement can really be separated from the
warrant requirement.214
The strongest possible support for the Second Circuit’s position
probably rests in Verdugo-Urquidez, but even reliance on that case
would be misplaced. Verdugo-Urquidez addressed searches related to
nonresident aliens in foreign countries, and as emphasized above, the
Court was careful to establish that the case hinged on the fact that
the Fourth Amendment was never intended to “restrain the actions
of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United
States territory.”215 While it might be argued that the case could
nevertheless logically be extended even to U.S. citizens, such a
position would require ignorance of the rationale offered by the
Verdugo-Urquidez Court to explain the holding. Specifically, though
nonresident aliens perhaps have indeed not established “sufficient
connection” with the United States to be considered part of the U.S.

214. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
215. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (emphasis added).
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community, certainly U.S. citizens have.216 Given the VerdugoUrquidez Court’s reliance on social compact ideas, the fact that U.S.
citizens have given up some rights in order to be a part of the
community should entitle them to partake in some of the benefits
thereof. As specifically applied to the details of this case, for instance,
the fact that U.S. citizens have no right to resist valid search warrants
should entitle them to having one presented in the first place.
While the Second Circuit also implied in a footnote to this
section that making probable cause determinations for the issuance
of overseas intelligence-related warrants is outside the competence of
the judiciary,217 such a proposition has been flatly rejected by the
Supreme Court. Though the primary focus in Keith had been on
domestic national security issues, the Court nevertheless generally
addressed the government’s contention that political and national
security issues were beyond the command of the judiciary.218
Pointedly, the Court stated that judges “regularly deal with the most
difficult issues of our society,” and that there was “no reason to
believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending
of the issues involved . . . .”219 Moreover, the Second Circuit’s
opinion itself bears this out. Though the court expressed that the
warrant requirement should be abandoned because of a concern that
“a domestic judicial officer’s ability to determine the reasonableness
of a search is diminished where the search occurs on foreign soil,”220
the court thereafter turned to an ex post analysis of the very issue—
that is, whether the search at issue had been conducted reasonably. If
the judiciary can be trusted to make such a determination ex post, it
is not entirely clear why they cannot be given the same trust to
conduct such a review ex ante. The most likely explanation for the
Second Circuit’s position on this matter is that it evidently accepted
the government’s argument that even the perception of a potential
security breach would hinder like investigations. The trouble with
this argument is that, taken to its extreme, it would require the
judiciary to be completely excised from the process. For example, in

216. If U.S. citizens have not established enough of a connection, one would be hard
pressed to explain who has.
217. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges) (Terrorist Bombings), 552 F.3d 157, 170 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008).
218. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 319–20 (1972).
219. Id. at 320.
220. Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 170 n.7.
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denying El-Hage’s evidentiary hearing, the court said that the
ongoing investigation into al-Qaeda required that the evidentiary
review be conducted out of the eye of the public, in an in camera, ex
parte manner. But if the judiciary cannot be trusted not to breach
security at the warrant issuance stage, surely its involvement at the
evidentiary hearing stage has no less potential for harm when
investigations continue in the midst of prosecutions.
The fact is that the judiciary abdicates its responsibility to act as a
neutral and detached observer when it refuses to carry out its role as
intermediary between the executive and individual citizens. While
the judiciary indeed may not be as attuned to foreign affairs as the
executive, the executive is not left completely at the mercy of a
magistrate in this regard. Indeed, while, as noted above, a suspect
often will not be represented when evidentiary reviews are made, the
government—and more precisely, the executive—will be. Thus,
concern over judicial ignorance ultimately returns to the fact that the
executive must fulfill its obligation to persuade the judiciary that
cause exists to perform a constitutional search.
2. Inadvisability of conditioning government surveillance on the
practices of foreign states
Insofar as the record indicates, there was no suggestion by either
of the Terrorist Bombings parties that the warrant requirement
dictates that U.S. officials obtain a search warrant from an overseas
magistrate (or some equivalent thereof) in order to conduct a valid
search against an overseas U.S. citizen. Nevertheless, the court
apparently felt compelled to proclaim that “nothing in the history of
foreign relations of the United States would require U.S. officials
[to] obtain warrants from foreign magistrates before conducting
searches overseas or, indeed, to suppose that all other states have
search and investigation rules akin to our own.”221 It seems that this
was a point on which all parties could have agreed because the issue
was not that a warrant should be required in order to increase the
legitimacy of the search from the perspective of a foreign
government, but rather that obtaining a warrant is required to satisfy
the U.S. Constitution. The Second Circuit seemed to have realized
this distinction since it left in place the requirement that overseas
searches meet the reasonableness aspect of the Fourth Amendment;
221. Id. at 170.
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so it is unclear why it believed that the issuance of a warrant would
be any different. The only insight comes from the court’s reliance on
language from Verdugo-Urquidez, wherein the Supreme Court had
alluded to the fact that “the Constitution does not condition our
government’s investigative powers on the practices of foreign legal
regimes . . . .”222 While true, this language misses the point, explored
in more depth in section three below, that the Constitution does—
or at least should—regulate the conduct of our own government.
Perhaps an issue tangentially related to this point was at work in
the court’s analysis of this factor. Namely, though the Second Circuit
did not explore it in great detail, it did note the district court’s
observation that requiring a warrant for overseas intelligence-related
searches could inordinately delay executive action to carry out such
searches. Such a delay in the area of national security could
admittedly have grave consequences. That said, there is no legitimate
explanation offered by either court as to why such a scenario would
not fall squarely within the already well-established bounds of the
exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement.223 In
contrast to throwing the entire warrant requirement out the window,
applying the exigent circumstance doctrine to overseas searches
conducted for intelligence purposes would have been more in line
with established Fourth Amendment doctrine.
3. U.S. warrant’s lack of authority overseas
On a point related to the last factor, the court’s assertion that a
U.S. warrant would lack any legal authority overseas also misses the
mark. With this contention, just as with the last, the court seems to
center its attention on the impact of a warrant upon the foreign
power exercising jurisdiction over the area searched. The significance
of a warrant for an overseas search, however, does not lie in the
warrant’s influence upon foreign officials, but rather in the legitimacy
it instills on the search, any seized evidence, and the U.S. judicial

222. Id. at 171.
223. The most that is said about this issue is the district court’s assertion that, although
El-Hage apparently attempted to make this point, the court was “not persuaded that the
exigent circumstances doctrine provides enough protection for the interests at stake.” United
States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden II), 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Further,
neither court acknowledged the fact that the electronic surveillance was conducted for
approximately a year, leading one to question the legitimacy of the need for the exigent
circumstances exception in this case anyway.
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process itself. Indeed, foreign power or not, arguably the only way to
comport with the very principles underlying the Fourth Amendment
would be to obtain a warrant under such circumstances.
As noted above, the purpose of the warrant requirement is not to
satisfy foreign officials, but to ensure that an overzealous executive
does not trample the rights of those entitled to constitutional
protection. Repeatedly, in Johnson, Katz, Keith, and Ehrlichman, for
example, courts have rejected the notion that the executive is
competent to serve as the neutral and detached official necessary to
authorize a valid search. Congress apparently thought the same,
given its language in FISA requiring the executive to obtain FISC
approval for intelligence-related searches against U.S. persons.
Though the executive may see the warrant requirement as a hurdle,
or as some sort of a condemnation of its integrity, its point is not to
impugn. Instead, the requirement for judicial interposition
recognizes the fact that the American people do not expect, or
indeed even wish for, the executive to be neutral. As Justice Douglas
stated in Katz, the duty of the executive is to “vigorously investigate
and prevent breaches of [the law] and prosecute those who violate”
it.224 On the other hand, part of the beauty of our system is that it
establishes a process whereby this vigor is tempered by the judiciary
in order to ensure protection of constitutional liberties.
The issue, in short, is not the legitimacy that foreign officials vest
in a U.S. warrant, it is rather the legitimacy that defendants facing
charges in U.S. courts can confer in it. Obviously, as the Second
Circuit rightly noted, a U.S. warrant may have no authority
overseas—but that is beside the point. The real concern is the
influence it carries within the United States, and the questions that
arise about the legitimacy of a search conducted without a warrant.
Although the executive might suggest that searches for national
security purposes are unique, such a contention arguably strengthens
rather than weakens the need for a judicial intermediary because of
the otherwise plenary power the executive has regarding foreign
affairs.
The Second Circuit had perhaps a stronger point, however,
when it asserted that a U.S. warrant would not necessarily compel
the intended target of a search to comply with its terms. This point
can be addressed, though, in light of the acceptance of the Supreme

224. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359–60 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Court of certain social compact theories. More directly, the Court
argued in Verdugo-Urquidez that a nonresident alien was not part of
the U.S. “compact” because such a person has not given up any
rights in order to obtain the benefits that flow from the
Constitution. But where a person has, such an individual must
recognize that with those benefits come certain prohibitions on
one’s conduct. Thus, though the court seemed to ignore this fact,
the truth is that a U.S. citizen would in fact be compelled to adhere
to a search warrant simply by virtue of citizenship and by the fact
that he has received the benefit of having a search warrant presented
in the first place. In other words, receiving the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment also requires that one adhere to the obligations
associated with it.225
4. Absence of mechanism for obtaining a U.S. warrant
Although the Second Circuit chose not to resolve the issue of
whether there was a mechanism for a U.S. magistrate to issue an
overseas warrant, it stated that it was at least unclear whether such a
procedure existed. Indeed, this factor was perhaps the most
challenging aspect of the Terrorist Bombings case. As the district
court had pointed out, at the time the case was originally prosecuted,
there was no statutory provision authorizing the issuance of an
overseas warrant for either criminal or intelligence-related
investigations.226 But while the district court acknowledged that “the
acquisition [of a warrant] would certainly have been impracticable,”
it did not accept that it would have been impossible.227
Actually, the government itself had even conceded the possibility
that a court’s authority to issue warrants was not contingent upon
Congress’s establishment of a statutory procedure to do so.228
Without such a statutory scheme, however, the judiciary would have
to rely upon its own inherent authority—whatever that might be—to
carry out its constitutional obligation to issue warrants.229 The idea,
though not exactly commonplace, was also not novel; El-Hage had
225. While some may argue that it cannot be assumed that a U.S. citizen abroad will
consent to the search, this misses the point. The argument here is that, regardless of whether
the individual consents, a warrant imbues the search with legitimacy.
226. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 276 n.13.
227. Id. at 276–77.
228. Id. at 277 n.16.
229. Id.
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essentially made such an argument in his appeal, and the court itself
outlined several cases that seemed to support such a possibility. For
example, in United States v. New York Telephone Co., the Supreme
Court acknowledged, without rejecting the practice, that Courts of
Appeals had authorized warrants under “an inherent power . . . to
issue search warrants under circumstances conforming to the Fourth
Amendment.”230 And the circuits, indeed, had been far more
straightforward about the issue. The Seventh Circuit, for instance,
had established that “the power to issue a search warrant was
historically, and is still today, an inherent (by which we mean simply
a nonstatutory, or common law) power of a court of general
jurisdiction.”231 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit also explicitly approved
of the issuance of warrants without statutory authority in order to
comport with the Fourth Amendment.232 Thus, it would not have
been astounding for the court to determine that, despite the
procedural oddities, the government had an obligation to pursue a
warrant for the searches against El-Hage, regardless of whether or
not a court ultimately granted one. Unmistakably this argument
imputes the government with a degree of foresight, but given the
rights at stake, it does not seem unreasonable to require such.
B. A Better Way
To be sure, there is no doubt that the Second Circuit was caught
between a rock and a hard place with the Terrorist Bombings case,
especially given the state of the law at the time of its underlying
events. Perhaps the court felt it was faced with two equally
unappealing choices: either uphold the Fourth Amendment and
likely allow an alleged mass-murderer to go free, or dismiss the
dictates of the Fourth Amendment and deem the warrant
requirement inapplicable overseas. With the issue framed this way,
maybe the court’s disposition of the case is less troubling.
But there was a middle course. A better solution would have
been for the Second Circuit to have simply affirmed the district
court’s application of the foreign intelligence exception to the
searches against El-Hage. Though this exception had subsequently

230. 434 U.S. 159, 169 n.14 (1977).
231. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984).
232. Bin Laden II, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 276 n.16 (citing United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d
674, 678 (8th Cir. 1994)).
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been absorbed by amendments to FISA, the appellate court could
have legitimately adopted it in light of its widespread application
across the circuits when the alleged crimes were committed. Further,
because the exception had not been rejected on the basis of a faulty
interpretation of law—but rather was abandoned owing only to the
difficulty of applying it in certain circumstances—adopting it in
Terrorist Bombings would not have been unreasonable. More
precisely, in a case arising after the district court’s decision, the
foreign intelligence exception had essentially been rejected by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Review Court because of the
exception’s requirement that a court determine whether a search had
been conducted primarily for criminal or intelligence purposes. In
this case, given the nature of the searches against El-Hage, and the
fact that they concluded almost a full year before any of the crimes
with which he was charged were carried to fruition, the government
had a very strong argument that the searches were primarily related
to intelligence collection. Indeed, this was the very argument the
government had in fact made at both the district and appellate court
levels and the argument that the district court had accepted. But, in
rejecting the foreign intelligence exception, the Second Circuit
essentially painted itself into a corner—if there was no easy way to
obtain a warrant, then it had to either suppress critical evidence or
determine that there must not be a warrant requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note ends where it began; namely, with the recognition
that “[s]ociety is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the
guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law.”233
Apparently the evidence against El-Hage was damning, and clearly
his alleged crimes were horrific. It would certainly have been a
travesty, therefore, to allow him to escape punishment if he were
guilty. It is perhaps a greater tragedy, however, to trample the
constitutional rights of those who are wrongly subjected to the
overzealousness of mistaken or misguided U.S. law enforcement
officials. Fortunately, there is a small ray of hope since, as currently
constituted, FISA now directs that if a “significant portion” of a
search is conducted for foreign intelligence purposes, then a FISA
233. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing United States
v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 674–75 (2d Cir. 1973)).
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order is required even for searches against U.S. persons abroad.234
The problem is that in not applying the foreign intelligence
exception in Terrorist Bombings—regardless of its subsequent
mootness after the events of the case—the Second Circuit stripped
U.S. citizens abroad of their Fourth Amendment rights even for
searches carried out during the course of criminal investigations.
Hopefully, courts in other circuits will realize the impropriety of this
decision and will decline to adopt it. In the meantime, U.S. citizens
abroad will have to hope that they are not subject to investigations
within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit.
Carla Crandall

234. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2008).
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